University of California to lose security role at laboratories

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WASHINGTON - After a string of security lapses, the Energy Department gave notice Friday it intends to strip the University of California of its security and some management responsibilities involving nuclear weapons programs at Los Alamos and another government research lab.

Energy Secretary Bill Richardson told the university its contracts for managing the Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore labs ''must be restructured ... to make much-needed improvements to security and other facility operations.''

Richardson said in an interview that the university ''will still be actively involved'' in scientific aspects of the nuclear weapons programs, but some other management responsibilities, especially security, would transferred elsewhere.

The restructuring was expected to be worked out by September as part of a renegotiation of the government's contract with the university, Richardson said. He called the university's performance in managing security at the weapons labs unacceptable.

''The university welcomes the opportunity to work with DOE in this effort and to create a path forward that meets all security needs,'' Richard Atkinson, the university's president, said in a statement.

Richardson said it was important to keep the university's ''strong science and academic expertise'' as part of the weapons program ''so weapons scientists feel comfortable for their future.''

Negotiations will begin immediately to start the process of splitting management responsibilities at both the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California, the department said.

The university, which has managed the nuclear weapons program at Los Alamos since 1943 and the beginning Manhattan Project, which exploded America's first nuclear device in the New Mexico desert, has come under sharp criticism for security lapses in recent years.

The two-month disappearance of two computer hard drives from a vault at the Los Alamos lab caused a growing number of lawmakers in Congress to question whether a university atmosphere can mix with security needs of the nuclear weapons programs.

''There's still a culture of lax security,'' Richardson said Friday, referring to the government laboratories.

The government contract with the University of California expires in 2002. Department officials said the contract is expected to be re-negotiated this year.

''The department will immediately begin negotiations with the university to bring into their operations specific security and management expertise to implement (security) improvements,'' the department said in a statement.

The new chief of DOE's nuclear weapons agency, Undersecretary John Gordon, former deputy CIA director, was charged with overseeing the contract renegotiating and to address with the university ''the serious shortcomings ... at our weapons laboratories,'' the department said.

Richardson has expressed outrage over the disappearance of the two hard drives, containing nuclear secrets from a highly secured Los Alamos laboratory vault. He was even more incensed by not having learned of the security breach for nearly a month after it became known to some Los Alamos scientists.

The incident prompted demands in Congress for his resignation.

Last year, Richardson also was highly critical of the university's handling of a sophisticated laser program at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California. After repeatedly assuring the $1 billion laser program was on schedule and within budget, Richardson was told without warning there would be a $300 million cost overrun and substantial delays.

The University of California manages both Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore.

Earlier Friday, Richardson dismissed calls for his resignation as political rhetoric and said he will ''absolutely not'' step down over the security lapses at the Los Alamos weapons lab.

''I don't walk away from a fight,'' he said on NBC's ''Today.''

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